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Abstract While large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) makes many new applications
feasible, like Smart Cities, IoT also brings new concerns on data reliability, security
and privacy. The rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which relied on a de-
centralized, immutable and distributed ledger system for transaction data auditing,
provides a prospective solution to address the issues in IoT. The blockchain and smart
contract enabled security mechanism for IoT applications have attract an increasing
interests from both academia and industry. However, integrating cryptocurrency-
oriented blockchain technologies into IoT systems meets tremendous challenges on
scalability, storage capacity, security and privacy. Particularly, the performance of
blockchain networks significantly relies on the performance of consensus mecha-
nisms, e.g., in terms of data confidentiality, transactions throughput, and network
scalability. In this chapter, given an in-depth review of state-of-the-art blockchain
networks, key matrix of designing consensus mechanism for IoT networks are iden-
tified in terms of throughput, scalability and security. To demonstrate a case study on
designing scalable, lightweight blockchain protocols for IoT systems, a Microchain
framework is introduced and a proof-of-concept prototype is implemented in a
physical network environment. The experimental results verify the feasibility of
integrating the Microchain into IoT systems.
1 Introduction
With the proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT), a large volume of smart devices
is connected to the Internet at an unprecedented scale. The prevalence of IoT de-
vices has changed human lives by ubiquitously providing applications and services
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that have revolutionized transportation, healthcare, industrial automation, emergency
response, and so on. For instance, thanks to the rapid advances in IoT and edge-fog-
cloud computing technologies, which are among of hot research topics in Smart
Cities, Smart Public Safety (SPS) system has become feasible by integrating het-
erogeneous computing devices and different types of networks to collaboratively
provide seamless public safety services for communities and the society [32].
With an ever-increasing presence of IoT-based smart applications and their ubiq-
uitous visibility from the Internet, the highly connected smart IoT devices with a
huge volume of generated transaction data incur more concerns on security and
privacy [12]. IoT systems are deployed in a distributed network environment that
consists of a large number of devices with high heterogeneity and dynamics. The
heterogeneity and resource constraint at the edge networks necessitate a scalable,
flexible and lightweight system architecture that supports fast development and easy
deployment with multiple application vendors using non-standard development tech-
nologies. Furthermore, those smart devices are geographically scattered across the
near-site edge networks and managed by fragmented service providers that enforce
different security policies. Thus, traditional security policies on a centralized author-
ity basis, which suffer from the performance bottlenecks or single point of failures,
are not efficient and suitable to address the performance and security challenges in
IoT systems.
Recently, designing new decentralized security mechanisms for distributed net-
work applications becomes one of the most intensively studied topics both in
academia and industry. Blockchain, which acts as the fundamental protocol of Bit-
coin [31], has demonstrated great potential to revolutionize the fundamentals of
information technology (IT) due to many attractive properties, such as decentral-
ization and transparency [34]. Essentially, the blockchain is a public ledger based
on consensus rules to provide a verifiable, append-only chained data structure of
transactions. Blockchain uses a decentralized architecture that does not rely on a
centralized authority, so that the data can be stored and updated distributively under
a peer-to-peer network. It improves system availability and mitigates single point
failure problem compared to a centralized architecture.
In a blockchain network, a consensus mechanism is enforced on a large amount
of distributed nodes called miners to maintain the sanctity of the data recorded
on the blocks. The transactions are approved by miners and recorded in the time-
stamped blocks, where each block is identified by a cryptographic hash and chained
to preceding blocks in a chronological order. Therefore, multiple participants can
access and make changes to the shared public ledger stored worldwide on distributed
nodes maintained by âĂĲminer-accountantsâĂİ, as opposed to establishing and
maintaining trust with a transaction counter-party or a third-party intermediary. Thus,
blockchain is an ideal decentralized architecture to ensure distributed transactions
among all participants in a trustless environment, like edge-fog-edge computing
based IoT applications under heterogeneous network environment.
Recently, there are many reported efforts that aims at addressing security issues
in IoT systems leveraging the blockchain and smart contract enabled mechanisms for
IoT-based applications. For example, public safety system [56], smart surveillance
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system [30, 33], social credit system [23, 24, 55], decentralized data market [57],
space and avionics systems [6, 53], biometric imaging data processing [50], iden-
tification authentication and access control [51, 52]. All these reported researches
have verified that blockchain and smart contract together are promising to provide a
decentralized security mechanism to IoT systems. They have also shown that, how-
ever, directly integrating existing cryptocurrency-oriented blockchain technologies
into IoT systems is hindered by several challenges in terms of scalability, computing
intensity, storage capacity, data security, and privacy preservation.
The efforts in blockchain-enabled services for IoT system face critical challenges
in designing blockchain network in terms of high quality of service, data confiden-
tiality and privacy-awareness. Particularly, the performance of blockchain networks
significantly relies on the efficiency of the consensus mechanisms, e.g., in terms
of data consistency, speed of consensus finality, robustness to arbitrarily behaving
nodes, and network scalability [47]. Unfortunately, existing blockchain protocols
are mainly designed for cryptocurrency, and they are not suitable to be directly
embedded into IoT scenarios.
To evaluate the challenges in designing blockchain protocols for IoT systems,
this chapter provides a comprehensive overview on present blockchain networks
regarding cryptographic technologies and incentive mechanisms. This chapter is
organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of blockchain fabric in the
angles of system design and implementation. Section 3 explains the basics of clas-
sic fault-tolerant consensus in distributed systems, and highlights two most popular
blockchain consensus protocols: BFT-based consensus and Nakamoto consensus.
Given the analysis on existing issues of classic consensus protocols, Section 4 dis-
cusses several emerging consensus protocols that improve performance and security
in blockchain networks. General challenges on integrating blockchain with IoT are
identified in Section 5 based on the state-of-the-art developments. In Section 6, Mi-
crochain, a hybrid blockchain architecture, is introduced as a case study on designing
scalable, lightweight blockchain protocols for IoT systems. Section 7 concludes this
chapter and summarizes the future research opportunities for blockchain technology
within the context of IoT systems.
2 An Overview of Blockchain Fabric
Compared to the traditional distributed computing paradigm with a clear client-
server model, a blockhchain network allows every participant to be both a client
(to issue transactions) and a server (to validate and finalize transactions) [49]. Each
participant could maintain a local view of the distributed ledger, which contains
valid transactions and data. The ledger should be consistent with other nodes across
the network given a underlying consensus protocol in the blockchain. The core task
of a blockchain network is to ensure that the trustless nodes in the network reach
agreements upon a single tamper-proof record of transactions [47]. The decentralized
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Fig. 1 An overview of blockchain fabric implementation.
network architecture and the fault-tolerance enabled consensus protocol allows the
blockchain to be a prospective infrastructure for distributed services and applications.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the blockchain infrastructure from the perspec-
tive of system level design and implementation. The application layer, which is on top
of the global state machine replication (SMR) layer, exerts smart contracts to build
a wide range of applications. The global SMR layer serves as a basic service level
of the blockchain to support distributed computing functions for upper applications.
The consensus layer acts as a core layer in the whole system by executing the con-
sensus protocol to ensure tamper-proof of the distributed ledger and the SMR. The
main function of the data organization and network layer is to identify an optimized
data representation and an efficient cryptography to improve the performance of the
blockchain given a certain network environment.
2.1 Application Layer
In general, the emerging blockchain-enabled applications could be divided into two
categories: (1) cryptocurrency and payment; and (2) the service provision based on
blockchain. In short, cryptographic currencies date back to ChaumâĂŹs proposal
for âĂĲuntraceable paymentsâĂİ in 1983, a system involving bank-issued cash in
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the form of blindly signed coins [7]. Bitcoin [31] has been considered as the most
successful cryptocurrency since it was developed in 2008. Inspired by Bitcoin’s
success, other cryptocurrency, like Ethereum [1] and Litecoin [3], has been springing
out to join the competition in cryptocurrency market. Thus, cryptocurrency is a
classical blockchain application, which tries to build a decentralized digital payment
system based on cryptocurrency technology.
The blockchain-based service provision usually utilizes special characteristics
of blockchain networks, such as self-organization, decentralization, and security, to
guarantee target features provided in their respective services. A decentralized data
marketplace (DDM) could use blockchain and smart contract technologies to provide
secured transactions and data integrity in a self-organized big data marketplace
[37, 57]. Another prospective application is distributed security service infrastructure
to provides flexible and scalable data access control and privacy preservation for
applications, like public social security and smart public safety system.
2.2 Global State Machine Replication (SMR) Layer
The global SMR layer acts as a distributed virtual computing service based on a
smart contract or distributed data service provision. The consensus mechanism en-
sures all participants have agreements in the same transaction within a fault tolerance
threshold. Therefore, the global SMR is achieved through the secure updating of the
distributed ledger maintained by the blockchain network. Emerging from the intel-
ligent property, a smart contract allows users to achieve agreements among parties
through a blockchain network. By using cryptographic and security mechanisms, a
smart contract combines protocols with user interfaces to formalize and secure the
relationships over computer networks [45]. A smart contract includes a collection
of pre-defined instructions and data that have been saved at a specific address of the
blockchain as a Merkle hash tree, which is a constructed bottom-to-up binary tree
data structure. Through exposing the public functions or application binary inter-
faces (ABIs), a smart contract interacts with users to offer the predefined business
logic or contract agreement. Owing to the encapsulation of predefined operational
logic and public exposed ABIs, smart contract is an ideal decentralized app (Dapp)
backbone to support upper level applications.
2.3 Consensus Layer
Given a cryptographic data organization and a blockchain network setting, the con-
sensus layer provides the core functionality to maintain data integrity, consistence
and order of data in the distributed ledger across the trustless network. From the
prospective of consensus design, the consensus protocol and incentive mechanism
are two key parts to ensure the performance and security of a blockchain network.
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The Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) replication consensus protocols, like PBFT [11]
and Ripple [40], execute the consensus algorithm among a small group of nodes
which are authenticated by the network administrator. They are well adopted in the
permissioned blockchain network in which the access control strategies for network
management are enforced. On the contrary, the Proof-of-Concept (PoC) consensus
protocols, like PoW and PoS, utilizes probabilistic finality schemes to achieve the
consensus agreement in a open access network environment. Therefore, they pro-
vide core consensus frameworks in permissionless blockchain networks, e.g. Bitcoin
and Ethereum. Other consensus protocols borrow ideas form two basic consensus
mechanisms to build hybrid variants.
The consensus protocol guarantees achieving the agreement among the nodes.
However, it is expected to be Incentive Compatible to prevent disagreements among
nodes in a network because of faults or dishonest participants. Therefore, design of
the consensus protocol (mining mechanism) relies on both cryptographic technolo-
gies and incentive mechanisms. The incentive compatibility of the protocol has been
openly questioned from game theoretical perspectives, so that game theory are well
used to analyze the strategies of consensus participants [26].
2.4 Data Organization and Network Layer
The data organization protocols use a set of cryptographic functionality to establish a
unique identity and provide a fundamental protection of data confidentiality, integrity
and privacy in the blockchain network. For example, asymmetric encryption could
generate the public key and private key pairs. The public key is used to create the
blockchain address and encrypted transactions, while the private keys could be used
to create the digital signature for future verification. As the atomic data structure
of a blockchain, transactions are created and signed by users or smart contracts.
Each miner collects transactions on the network, and proposes blocks, where hashed
transactions are represented by a Merkle tree [29]. The blocks are organized as the
"chains of block" in a chronological order. In general, the data order uses a linear
linked blocks structure. To improve the processing efficiency, network scalability
and security, the linear data organization framework has been expanded into the
nonlinear forms, such as trees [18] or graphs of blocks [42]. Each participants use
its storage of ledger replica as local database to join the mining task, and regularly
synchronize local ledger replica with the globalledger.
Network synchronous setting greatly influences the blockchain network in terms
of consensus protocols and data representation. The synchronous network envi-
ronment is a basic assumption of designing distributed consensus protocol. In a
synchronous network, all messages could be delivered successfully within a fix up-
per bound on the time. While in a partially synchronous network, all operations and
messages delivery are loosely coordinated based on an uncertain upper bound. In a
asynchronous network, the upper bound on the time does not exist so that where is
not a delay guarantee on message delivery.
Microchain: a Light Hierarchical Consensus Protocol for IoT System 7
3 Distributed Consensus Protocols and Algorithms
In a distributed system, all participants cooperate with each others to achieve a
common goal in spite of geographically separated locations. Since each node could
be prone to system faults and communication channels suffer from adversarial at-
tacks, consensus mechanism allows that the participants still can reach agreement on
global state in the presence of component failures, either crash failure or Byzantine
failure. The crash failure happens when the host system of participant abruptly stop
functioning and cannot resume by itself. While Byzantine failure is caused by sys-
tem malfunctions or malicious behaviors, such as sending contradictory messages
to partners or withholding messages. Therefore, the consensus protocol is aimed to
solve fault-tolerant problems in distributed system scenarios.
A consensus protocol defines a set of rules for message passing and processing
for all networked components to reach agreement on a common subject [48]. A
messaging passing rule specifies the way of messages broadcasting and relaying
among system components. A processing rule defines how a component changes its
internal state as receiving these valid messages. The goal of consensus is reached as
long as all non-faulty participants make agreement on a target subject. In general,
the tolerant number of faulty nodes in a network is used to measure the strength of
a consensus protocol from security’s perspective. Given two failure types, the fault
tolerant problems are divided into Crash-Fault Tolerant (CFT) and Byzantine-Fault
Tolerant (BFT). A consensus protocol that tolerates at least one crash failure is
called CFT, while BFT requires that a consensus protocol can tolerate at least one
Byzantine failure. In terms of failures, crash failure is considered as a benign case
while Byzantine failure is considered the worst case. Therefore, a BFT consensus is
naturally CFT [48]. In a more precise way, BFT consensus protocol must satisfy the
following properties:
• Validity (Correctness): If a honest node receives a valid common replicate
proposed by other nodes, this common replicate should be accepted into the
blockchain.
• Agreement (Consistency): All the honest nodes should update their local replicates
of the blockchain with the block header of confirmed global blockchain.
• Termination (Liveness): Every honest node should either discard or accept new
transactions into the blockchain, and all transactions originated from the honest
nodes will be eventually confirmed.
• Integrity (Total Order): All honest nodes should accept the same chronological or-
der of transactions which are correctly appended to the hash-chained blockchain.
In a consensus algorithm, validity, integrity and agreement define the consensus
safety properties, while termination defines its liveness property. Given variant con-
sensus protocols, the blockchain networks could be categorized into permissionless
blockchain (e.g., Nakamoto Consensus Protocols), permissioned blockchain (e.g.,
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus) and hybrid blockchain. The remain-
der of this section will focus on underlying consensus protocols for blockchain in
terms of the consensus goal and network model.
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Fig. 2 Example for Byzantine Problem in a three participants network.
3.1 Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus
The classic consensus in a distributed system can be expressed abstractly as a Byzan-
tine General Problem [22], which copes with single value agreement among differ-
ent parts of a system given failure of communication or conflicting information.
Formally, the Byzantine General Problem can be explained in a message-passing
system with N participants pi ∈ P, where i ∈ (1, 2, ..., N). They are geographically
distributed and inter-connected by communication links. They communicate with
each others only through broadcasting messages across the network to make agree-
ment on a common plan of action: a (attack) or r (retreat). To achieve a agreement
on a single value, each participant broadcast his/her vote for a or r and makes his/her
decision locally based on the received votes.
Due to the Byzantine failure, some dishonest participants f attempt to prevent
consensus by sending contradicting votes to different nodes. Therefore, in a network
including N nodes, the ultimate goal is that all loyal participants still agree on the
consistent action in spite of the Byzantine failure. It requires the super-majority of
the participants must be honest, which means N − f > 2 f . So that we can get
N > 3 f + 1. This can be defined as Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In a message-passing system with n nodes, if there are f Byzantine
nodes and n 6 3 f , then no solution for system to achieve consensus goal. 
Theorem 1 has been conveniently proved by contradiction in Pease, M’s work
[36]. Figure 2 illustrates the Theorem 1 in a three nodes scenario with a single
Byzantine node. We specify p1 as the commander, and p2, p3 are lieutenants. A
traitor could be the commander or a lieutenant. In Fig. 2a), p1 send contradictory
actions a (attack) and r (retreat) to p2 and p3, respectively. Since each lieutenants
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will obey the order from commander, so that p2 decide to "attack" while p3 start
"retreat". It violates the IC1 that all loyal lieutenants must obey the same order, then
consensus goal failed. In such a scenario, both p2 and p3 cannot identify whether
the commander is a traitor. Figure 2b) demonstrate a scenario in which a lieutenant
is traitor. Since p3 is a traitor and always makes a different action from p2, so that
all lieutenants cannot agree on the same action. Thus, consensus goal cannot be
achieved.
3.1.1 Oral Messaging (OM) Algorithm for BFT Consensus
TheOralMessaging (OM) algorithmwas firstly proposed as a solution to the original
Byzantine generals problem [22]. It assumes that there is a leader who acts as
the "commander" to trigger the OM process and the other N − 1 participants are
"lieutenants" who orally pass around messages they received. Given assumptions
that at most f participants are Byzantine-fault nodes, OM( f ) could achieve BFT
consensus if f satisfies the Theorem 1, so that N > 3 f + 1. The definition of an oral
message is based on the following assumptions [22]:
• A1. Every sent message is delivered correctly.
• A2. The receiver of a message knows the sender.
• A3. The absence of a message can be detected.
Assumptions A1 and A2 are mainly to prevent a traitor’s interference on com-
munication between each nodes. A1 specifies that the network is synchronous so
that the message can be delivered on time without error. A2 could prevent traitor
from confusing others by introducing a spurious message. A3 prevents a traitor from
keeping silence by simply withholding message.
Figure 3 demonstrates how OM achieves consensus goal in a four-nodes system
including only one Byzantine-fault node. We specify p1 as commander, and p2,
p3, p4 are lieutenants. A traitor could be commander or lieutenant. As a lead, p1
firstly starts to send a order message to other 3 lieutenant. In consensus stage, p2, p3
and p4 share their received message from p1. Given received messages from other
lieutenants, each lieutenant makes a local decision based on the output of a function
majority, which is defined as:majority(v1, v2, ..., vn−1) = v, where v is the majority
value of vi .
Figure 3b) illustrates a scenario in which a lieutenant is the traitor. In the first
step of OM(1), commander p1 starts to send same order message v1(a) to other
three lieutenants. In the second stage, p2, p2 and p4 use the trivial algorithm OM(0)
to send their order messages to other two lieutenants. Finally, given received order
messages (v2(a), v3(a), v4(?)), each lieutenant could use majority function to calcu-
late the correct value a = majority(a, a, ?). Figure 3a) shows a scenario in which
a commander is the traitor. Since p1 is a traitor, arbitrary value x, y and z are sent
to other loyal lieutenants. Finally, each lieutenant received same order messages set
(v2(x), v3(y), v4(z)). Therefore, they all get same value v = majority(x, y, z). No
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Fig. 3 Example for Oral Messaging (OM) Algorithm BFT Consensus.
matter which algorithm used by majority, like average or maximum, they always
could make agreement on a common action.
The oral messaging algorithmOM( f ) is executed in a recursive fashion with f +1
rounds. At the end ofOM(0), every lieutenant has exactly the same set of vote value
calculated by majority. Thus, OM( f ) algorithm has O(N f+1) complexity, which is
impractical when N is large.
3.1.2 Practical BFT Consensus
The classical BFT provides a solution to the single-value consensus in a synchronous
network.However, the correctness of a typical distributed systemnot only requires ev-
ery single data message is processed correctly, but it also means the processed results
should satisfy the total ordering requirement. Moreover, the real-world distributed
computing system relies on a partial synchronous network, or even asynchronous
network. Therefore, the classical BFT consensus cannot address complex issues in
a real-world distributed computing network.
Since the sequential operations could be defined as state machines, which consists
of state variables, which encode the state and commands, which transform its state
[38]. Therefore, SMR is widely used as an active replication to ensure the data
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Fig. 4 The normal operation sub-protocol of VR in a 3-replicas system.
ordering consensus. The consensus protocol could be executed as a deterministic
state machine, which is deployed on multiple distributed servers. Given the inputs,
the state machine could change states and produce outputs in an organized manner.
Through replicating the state machine across the server replicas, the SMR provides
a fault-tolerant solution to the consensus protocol in distributed networks. There are
two basic service requirements for SMR based protocol:liveness and safety. safety
requires that all replicasmust execute the same sequence of operations, while liveness
ensures that all valid requests are executed within the consensus round.
The next sectionswill introduce two SMRbased fault tolerant consensus protocols
for distributed computing network: Viewstamped Replication (VR) and Piratical
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT).
3.1.3 Viewstamped Replication (VR)
The original Viewstamped Replication (VR) protocol was firstly developed in 1980s
[35], and a updated was present in 2012 [25]. The VR protocol is aimed to use
state machine replication to address fault tolerance issues in distributed systems. VR
works in an asynchronous network like the Internet, and handles failures in which
nodes fail by crashing [35]. In a VR system that includes N replicas, one replica
works as the primary and other N−1 replicas are backups. The primary is responsible
for ordering client’s request while the backups simply accept orders collected by the
primary. Each replica operates a local state machine with pre-defined state variables.
VR ensures reliability and availability when no more than a threshold of f replicas
are faulty [25]. The total replicas N in VR system should be no less than 2 f + 1,
which is the minimum replicas to ensure CFT in a asynchronous network. VR uses
three sub-protocols to provide correctness:
• Normal protocol: the normal operation processes user’s requestswhen the primary
is not faulty and other backups hold the same view. Figure 4 describes the normal
operationworkflow in aVR systemwith three replicas. A client sends an operation
request to the primary at the beginning of a protocol run. On receiving a request
message, the primary starts the Prepare stage by firstly updating its local state,
then it forwards the request to all backups using Preparemessage. Upon receiving
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the Preparemessage, each backup locally executes the operation request from the
primary and then update its state with the given executing results. Finally, every
backup sends a PrepareOK message to the primary to notify that it has finished
the operation and updated the state. After receiving f PrepareOK messages, the
primary starts the PrepareOK stage by executing the operation and updating its
state accordingly. Then, the primary send a Reply message back to the client to
wrap up the replication session.
• View change protocol: This sub-protocol is designed to address the failure of the
primary. Since backups only accept the order request from the primary, if a timeout
expires without receiving the Prepare message from the primary, a backup can
launch a view change request. After detecting condition for view change, a backup
updates its status to VIEW-CHANGE, and sends a StartViewChange message to
other replicas. When a replica collects at least f StartViewChange messages, it
sends aDoTheViewChangemessage to the replica who launches the view change.
When the new primary receives at least of f + 1 DoTheViewChange messages,
it updates its state accordingly, and sends a StartView message to notify other
replicas to finish the view change process.
• Recovery protocol: When a replica recovers from a crash, it cannot participant
in a normal processing and view changes due to the out-of-dated state. To start
the recovery protocol, a recovering replica sends a Recovery message to all other
replicas. Each replica responds with a RecoveryResponse message indicating the
current view and state. Upon received at lease f +1 RecoveryResponsemessages,
the recovering replica updates its local state accordingly.
Since VR is only a CFT based replication protocol which requires that total repli-
cas should satisfy N > 2 f + 1 to prevent crash failures, it does not handle Byzantine
failures as BFT consensus does. Given analysis on communication overhead on
normal operation, the message complexity for VR is O(N).
3.1.4 Piratical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
Since malicious attacks and software failures are increasingly common in distributed
networks, both the primary and backups in the replication system are vulnerable to
Byzantine failures. However, previous consensus protocols, either assumed a syn-
chronous network with high communication complexity, like BFT-OM algorithm
[22], or they cannot tolerant Byzantine failures, like VR [25, 35]. To provide a
practical and efficient BFT protocol under asynchronous environments, a Pirati-
cal Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) solution is proposed that advances the VR
protocol to tolerant Byzantine failures in a asynchronous network [10, 11].
The PBFT protocol can be used to implement any deterministic replicated service
with a state and some operations [11]. Given a replication system which has N
replicas and f are Byzantine faulty nodes, the PBFT algorithm guarantees safety
under condition N > 3 f + 1, which means at most f replicas are Byzantine faulty.
To provide liveness, PBFT assumes a synchronous network. Therefore, clients could
evenly receive replies to their operation requests only if at most f replicas are
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Fig. 5 The normal operation protocol of PBFT in a 4-replicas system.
Byzantine faulty and the process delay does not grow fast than upper bounded
time. Similar to the VR, PBFT utilizes the sub-protocol to implement a BFT based
distributed file system: normal case operation, view changes and checkpoint protocol.
• Normal operation: The normal case operation uses a three phase protocol to
automatically broadcast request among replicas, and it executes as session cycles
with an increasing view number. Figure 5 describes the normal case operation
workflow in a PBFT system with four replicas. Replica 0 acts as a primary while
other replicas are backups. A client sends operation request to the primary at the
beginning of a view session to launch the three phase consensus protocol.
1)Pre-prepare: After receiving a requestmessage from theClientC, theReplica 0
starts the phase onePre-prepare by firstly updating its local state, then itmulticasts
the request to other replicas using a Pre-prepare message. Upon receiving the
Pre-prepare message, each backup checks whether the message is with valid
signature and state information. If yes, the replica locally update its local status
and moves to the Prepare phase by sending a Prepare message to other replicas.
2) Prepare: If a backup agrees with the operation request, it votes for agreement
by multicasting a Prepare message to all replicas including the primary. After
receiving at least 2 f + 1 Pre-prepare messages with the same view number and
state information, a replica updates its local status accordingly and proceeds to
following Commit phase by sending a Commit message to other replicas. This
phase ensures that all replicas achieve a common state before executing assigned
operation requests.
3) Commit: Similar to phase two Prepare, each replica firstly check the received
Commit message until there are 2 f + 1 valid messages. In phase three Commit,
each replica firstly update its status to “commit”, then locally executes the assigned
operation request from the client and then update its state given executing results.
This phase ensures that executed operation requests could be totally in order
across cycle views.
Reply: When a replica finishes the commit phase, it communicates with the
client by sending a Replymessage, which encapsulates the total ordered operation
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Fig. 6 View changes workflow in a primary crash failure scenario.
request executions results and state information. The client accepts the execution
results after receiving at least 2 f + 1 Reply messages.
• View changes: This sub-protocol ensures liveness by selecting a new primary
among replicas to resume the normal operation when the current primary is in
crash failure. The basic idea is that enabling a new primary could get a stable
information, prepare certificates from a replica, and propagate this information
to the new view [10]. Figure 6 illustrates the view-changes protocol from v to
v + 1. Since the Replica 0 (primary{v}) is crash, the view changes are triggered
by a timeout which expires without receiving valid requests from the Replica
0. After the timer triggers view changes, a replica stops receiving messages
in current view and updates its status to VIEW-CHANGE. Then, it multicasts
a ViewChange message for view v + 1 to other replicas. After receiving the
ViewChangemessage, a replica accepts Replica 1 as the new primary{v + 1} and
sends a ViewChangeACK message to the new primary as agreement. When the
new primary collects at least 2 f ViewChangeACK messages, it updates the state
accordingly, and sends a New View message to notify other replicas to finish the
view change process and process normal operation.
• Checkpoint protocol: The checkpoint protocol allows all replicas to make agree-
ment on a stable checkpoint including the essential service state information, so
that old messages from the log are safely discarded. Each replica periodically
marks an executed operation request whose sequence number h is divisible by a
constant value (e.g., 100). Each replica broadcasts a Checkpoint message encap-
sulating checkpoint information to other replicas. After receiving at least 2 f + 1
Checkpointmessages with the same h, it labels checkpoint h as stable and records
the Checkpoint messages as the proof of correctness for stable checkpoint.
The PBFT assumes that total replicas N > 3 f + 1 when f replicas are Byzantine
failures. Therefore, messages from 2 f + 1 non-faulty replicas are enough to achieve
a super-majority consensus on voting process, like prepare and commit in normal
operation. The communication overhead is evaluated in terms of three phases. Since
only the primary multicasts messages to all replicas in the Pre-prepare phase, the
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complexity is O(N). In Prepare and Commit stages, every replica broadcasts a
message to other replicas, such that the complexity is O(N2).
3.2 Nakamoto Consensus Protocol
To jointly address several critical issues such as pseudonymity, scalability and poor
synchronization in an open-access network environment, the Nakamoto consensus
protocol [31] is implemented as the consensus foundation of Bitcoin. The Nakamoto
consensus is based on a cryptographic hash value discovery racing game called Proof-
of-Work (PoW), it is widely adopted by many cryptocurrency-based blockchain
networks. We use Bitcoin as the application background to explains Nakamoto
Consensus and summarize its constraints and security issues.
3.2.1 Network Model and Permission
Bitcoin is the most public blockchain network, and access permission is not required
for a new participant interacting with other nodes in the network. In the bitcoin
network, a fresh node simply connects network and searches a list of initial peers
from several known DNS servers. Then it retrieves a blockchain replica from peers
and uses its unique bitcoin account address to start normal operations, like sending
transactions and mining blocks.
The Bitcoin network relies on a peer-to-peer overlay network exposed to the pub-
lic Internet environment. Each node executes an instance of the Nakamoto consensus
protocol and maintains a replica of the blockchain. The network is modeled as an
asynchronous message-passing environment without bounded message delivery de-
lay among nodes. The FLP [15] has proven the impossible result in which consensus
can not be guaranteed in a fully asynchronous network with even one fault. How-
ever, Nakamoto specifies the termination requirement into Probabilistic finality to
practically circumvent the impossible consensus issue in an asynchronous network.
3.2.2 Consensus Protocol
The goal of Nakamoto consensus is to ensure all participants agree on a common
network transaction log as a serialized blockchain. Owing to a distributed network,
each node maintains a local replica and executes Nakamoto consensus protocol
independently. The security of the consensus protocol requires that the majority
of nodes are honest and they can correctly execute the consensus protocol. The
Nakamoto protocol can be summarized into the following rules:
• Message Gossiping Rule: All newly received and locally generated transactions
and blocks should be multicasted to peers in a timely manner. This ensures all
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nodes could receive transactions and blocks in spite of the asynchronous network
environment.
• Agreement Rule: After receiving a block, all honest nodes should either accept or
discard it based on the block’s validity. In other words, all honest nodes should
agree on the same blockchain if each nodes accepted the same number of blocks
in its local replica.
• Validation Rule: All received transactions and blocks need to be validated before
being appended to the blockchain or broadcasted to peers. Only valid transactions
could be saved into new blocks and valid blocks encapsulating valid transactions
could be accepted by the blockchain network.
• Proof-of-Work (PoW): Every node has to solve a computing-intensive, time-
consuming hash puzzle as a Proof-of-Work for block generation. In brief, PoW
solution requires exhaustively querying a cryptographic hash function for a partial
preimage generated from a candidate block [47]. The hashcode of a candidate
block is expected to satisfy a pre-defined difficulty condition parameter h, like
fixed length of bits are 0s. The PoW puzzle can be formally defined as the
following equation:
hash_block = H(block_data|nonce) 6 D(h) (1)
where for some fixed length of bits L and D(h) = 2L−h , H(·) is a pre-
defined collision-resistant cryptographic hash function that outputs hash string
L ∈ {0, 1}λ.
• Longest Chain Rule: All honest nodes should always extend proposed blocks on
the longest chain that they has ever found. The longest chain rule ensures the
consensus in an asynchronous network, such that all honest miners are working
on a common main chain. This rule ensures probabilistic finality given a certain
length of sequential blocks.
Above rules provide safety for achieving Nakamoto consensus in a distributed
network. However, incentive mechanism is also indispensable to a public blockchain
network, especially for those who act as financial infrastructure, like cryptocurrency
and digital payment systems. Nakamoto consensus uses block rewards and transac-
tion fees as an incentive mechanism to encourage participants to invest computation
power to join the network and make contributions.
3.2.3 Chain Finality and Complexity Analysis
The PoW process defined by Eq. (1) is essentially a verifiable process of a weighted
random coin-tossing, where the probability of winning is no longer uniformly asso-
ciated with the nodes’ identities but in proportion to the resources, e.g., hash rate
casted by the nodes [47]. In the PoW-like leader election process, the probability of
a node for winning the block generation follows:
pwin_block(i) = wi∑
i∈N wi
(2)
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where wi is the shared verifiable resource node i can has, such as computational
power, memory and storage, etc.
According to the longest-chain rule, blocks appended to a chain branch that is not
suffix of the longest chain shall be discarded or "orphaned". As defined by Eq. (2), if
attackers have more than 50% of the whole network’s gross hash computing power,
they will have higher hash generating rate so that producing blocks faster than rest
of the participants in the network. The probability of an attacker to win the longest
chain by continuously generating m blocks is:
Pwin_chain = ( pwin_block1 − pwin_block )
m (3)
The Pwin_chain drops exponentially asm increases if pwin_block < 0.5. Therefore,
if more than half of the miners are honest, it is computationally impossible for
attackers to revoke a block from the blockchain. Bitcoin network specifies m = 6
as the longest chain confirmation. Since the Nakamoto consensus protocol uses a
gospel style message delivery without using all-to-all message phase like BFT, it
also produces smaller communication complexity O(N).
3.2.4 Constraints and Vulnerabilities
TheNakamoto consensus protocol demonstrates good scalability in a trustless, open-
access network environment. However, PoW also incurs several performance issues,
such as limited throughput, high demand of computation and storage resources as
well as unsustainable energy consumption. Furthermore, verifiable random block
generation and probabilistic finality make Nakamoto consensus protocol vulnerable
to several security problems, like majority attack and selfish mining.
• Trade-off between performance and security: The difficulty level in the PoW
process is mainly to secure the block generation process. The average block
confirmation time inBitcoin is about tenminutes, whichmeans it can process up to
seven transactions per second. It becomes throughput bottleneck when blockchain
technology is applied to digital cash and payment systems, which require higher
transaction throughput. Increasing block size to commit more transactions and
reducing blockchain confirmation time are both solutions to improve transaction
throughput capacity. However, they increase block propagation delays and lead
to insufficient dissemination. Insufficient dissemination could cause higher fork
rate and be vulnerable to 51% attack and self-mining.
• Computation intensive and energy inefficiency: InBitcoin network, all participants
invest in more resource to win the computation-intensive puzzle-solving race.
This hash rate competition not only wastes computational power to calculate a
meaningless “nonce”, but also introduce huge energy cost.
• Majority (51%) attack: In Nakamoto Consensus, if attackers have more than 51%
network gross computing power, they can calculate the “nonce” value quicker
than other nodes in the network. As a result, attackers have a higher probability to
generate new blocks than others. Finally, the longer chain controlled by attackers
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is adopted as the main chain, while the blocks mined by honest nodes are dis-
carded. Through 51% attack, attackers can take control of the whole blockchain
network, launch malicious activities, like double spending, revoking transactions
and blocks, etc.
• Selfish mining: The Nakamoto consensus protocol provides 50% fault tolerance
given an assumption that all miners broadcast new blocks immediately upon
successful generation. However, malicious miners or mining pool may delay
broadcasting newlymined blocks but withholding the blocks, and releasing blocks
at a specific time to increase their benefit. As a results, honest miners waste their
computational power in verifying the already mined blocks, but malicious miners
can therefore increase their probability of mining the new blocks to gain rewards.
In the worst case, attackers can use selfish mining strategy to control the whole
blockchain network.
4 Emerging Consensus Protocols
In general, the PoW-based Nakamoto blockchain provides scalability and proba-
bilistic finality in partial synchronous or asynchronous networks at the cost of low
throughput and high energy assumption. Whereas BFT-based blockchains offer an
excellent performance and deterministic finality in permissioned networks consisting
of a small numbers of authorized replicas. However, due to the synchronous envi-
ronment requirement and communication complexity O(N2), traditional BFT-based
consensus protocols demonstrate limited scalablility when being applied to real
world applications. Interested readers are referred to [46, 13] for a comprehensive
evaluation.
To address the trade-offs in terms of performance, scalability and security, new
consensus protocols and blockchain schemes have been exploited both in academic
community and industry. This section introduces several emerging consensus proto-
cols that enable efficient and secured blockchain networks.
4.1 Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
The PoW is essentially a random leader-election process through a brute-force man-
ner to solve a cryptographic hash puzzle problem. To improve the computational-
intensive hash value calculating, Proof-of-Stake (Pos) was first proposed in Peercoin
[19] as an alternative to PoW in blockchain community. Within a Peercoin network,
a matric “coin age” is proposed to measure a minerâĂŹs stake by multiplying the
held tokens and the holding time. The PoS kernel protocol allows a miner to use its
stake to solve puzzle solution, then the probability of proposing a new block follows
the stake distribution. In a PoS consensus network, each validator uses its stake,
which is a amount of deposit currency, to participate the mining process. Mining
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block is designed as a random variable function:
TB(H(block_data|pki |si), δ) 6 D(δ, pi) (4)
where for adjustable difficulty parameter δ, D(δ, pi) = (2δ − 1)pi . H(·) is a pre-
defined collision-resistant cryptographic hash function that outputs a hash string.
The TB(·) function outputs lower bits of the hashcode. pi is the stake ratio of node
i to gross stake in the network, which can be represented as pi = si∑N
i=1 si
. N is the
total number of nodes in the network. The bigger stakeholder has a higher chance to
mine a new block.
The PoS also relies on the longest chain rule to achieve probabilistic finality in
the consensus process. Compared to PoW protocols that use the brute-force hashing
power to solve computation-intensive puzzle solution, PoS leverages the distribution
of token ownership to simulate a verifiable random function to propose new blocks.
Since the block miners only consume limited resources, PoS is also known as a
process of “virtual mining” [7]. Similar to the PoW in Nakamoto consensus, as
long as dishonest nodes own less than half of the total stake value in network, the
probability of a block being revoked from the blockchain drops exponentially as the
chain grows. In a PoS network, rational attackers have weak motivation to perform
51% attack, since deteriorate stake value is economically devastating the benefit of
attackers, who are also larger stakeholder.
4.2 Other Proof-of-Concept (PoX) Consensus Protocols
Under the successful framework of Nakamoto consensus protocol, a number of al-
ternative Proof of Concept (PoX) schemes have been proposed to address existing
issues of PoW in terms of security, fairness and sustainability. From a network-level
perspective, PoX generally relies on a pseudo-random oracle to provide the property
of verifiable unpredictability or lead-election process [47]. To address the issue of
centralized computation power pool, Proof of Memory (PoM), a memory-hard PoW
is adopted by ZCash [17] and Ethereum [9] networks. With the purpose of useful re-
source provision, the idea of “Proof of Useful Resources” (PoUS) has been proposed
to tackle the resource wasting problem of PoW [47]. The Proof of Exercise (PoE) is
proposed to replace the computation intensive searching problem in PoW with the
useful “exercise” of matrix product problems [41]. Based on the Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE), Resource-Efficient Mining (REM) [59] verifies and measures
the software running in an Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)-protected enclave
that randomly determines whether or not the work leads to a valid block proof.
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4.3 Hybrid Consensus Protocols
4.3.1 Bitcoin-NG
To improve the limited performance of permissionless consensus without under-
mining the unique features such as scalability, combining a scalable permissionless
consensus (e.g. PoW) with a high throughput permissioned consensus (e.g. BFT) be-
comes a prospective approach. The Bitcoin-NG [14] is proposed to improve the per-
formance of PoW-based Nakamoto protocol by decoupling BitcoinâĂŹs blockchain
operation into two planes: leader election and transaction serialization. The protocol
divides time into sequential epochs, and only a single leader is in charge of serializ-
ing state machine transitions in each epoch. To bootstrap the transaction throughput,
the protocol introduces two types of blocks, namely, the key blocks that require a
PoW puzzle solution for leader election and the microblocks that require no puzzle
solution and are used for transaction serialization [47]. Although Bitcoin-NG may
also experience key block forks, it scales optimally with bandwidth limited only by
the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the propagation time
of the network [14].
4.3.2 BFT-style PoS
Since the BFT consensus protocol uses a deterministic finality mechanism such
that all confirmed blocks will never be tampered with or revoked from blockchain.
Therefore, adopting BFT style chain finality to PoS consensus could ensure data
consistency and immediately finality. BFT-style PoS has been implemented in Ten-
dermint [21], Algorand [16] and Ethereum’s Casper [8]. Instead of following Nako-
moto’s contention-based blockchain generation process, BFT-style PoS embraces a
more radical design in which the set of validators periodically finalize blocks in the
main chain through BFT consensus [48]. Compared with tradition chain-based PoS
consensus protocols, BFT-style PoS provides a deterministic finality to guarantee
that finalized blocks cannot be revoked. Furthermore, deterministic finality allows
for designing reward and punishment strategy to discourage malicious validators to
launch attacks, such as double betting or nothing-at-stake attacks.
4.3.3 Parallelism in BFT Consensus
To design a computationally-scalable Byzantine consensus protocol for blockchain,
SCP [27] is proposed through incorporating BFT and sharding into blockchain con-
sensus. The key ideas are inspired by concept of “sharding” [13] in infrastructure of
distributed database and cloud. Through securely establishing identities for network
participants, whole network are randomly divided into several sub-committees. Each
sub-committee performs a classical BFT consensus protocol to process a separate
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set of transactions and propose blocks in parallel. A final committee is designated to
combine the outputs of sub-committees into an ordered blockchain data structure.
To extend existing consensus protocol based on SCP, Elastico [28] is proposed
to build a secure sharding protocol for open blockchains. In a epoch, the candi-
dates of committees attempt to find a PoW puzzle solution provided a seed called
“epochRandomness”, which is a public random number string generated in the pre-
vious epoch. Elastico exhibits almost linear scalability throughput with computation
capacity with roughly O(n) message complexity. However, the participants have to
download full blockchain data to perform the consensus task, which brings latency
in bootstrapping process and storage overload on client nodes.
To enable the parallelization of both network consensus and data storage, a “full
sharding” protocol called “OmniLedger” [20] is designed to provide “statistically
representative” shards for permissionless transaction processing. OmniLedger uses
a bias-resistant protocol called RandHound [44] to generate epoch global random-
ness strings for sharding committees formation. To optimize trade-off between the
number of shards, throughput and latency, the intra-shard consensus follows an
“Optional Trust-but-Verify Validation” model, where optimistic validators make a
provisional but unlikely-to-change commitment and core validators subsequently ver-
ify again the transactions to provide finality and ensure verifiability [20]. To secure
corss-shard transactions, OmniLedger introduces a novel Byzantine Shard Atomic
Commit protocol to handle atomically transactions processing across shards. Fur-
thermore, a gradually in-and-out committee members swap strategy could reduce
extra message overhead and bootstrapping the latency in shard reconstruction. An-
other epoch-based, two-level-BFT protocol called RapidChain [58] is proposed for
scaling blockchain via full sharding. RapidChain employs block pipelining strat-
egy to achieve very high throughputs in the intra-committee consensus. Further
more, a novel gossiping protocol for large blocks reduces the large overhead on
committee-to-committee communication, and ensures an efficient cross-shard trans-
action verification.
5 Challenges on Integration Blockchain with IoTs
Thanks to the distributed ledger, Blockchain can enrich the IoT by providing a trusted
sharing service, where information is reliable and can be traceable. Blockchain and
smart contract technologies are identified as the key to solve scalability, privacy, and
reliability problems related to the IoT paradigm. However, directly incorporating
blockchain into the IoT is infeasible. Since the traditional blockchain networks, like
bitcoin, were designed for an Internet-based scenario, where rich-resource devices
like computers are participants, and the network environment is stable. Consequently,
it cannot meet the requirements of IoT reality, such as constrained computation and
storage, communication efficiency and energy consumption, etc. Although several
recent efforts that focus on either improving the performance of PoW blockchain
like Bitcoin-NG [14] or scaling classical BFT protocols through parallelization
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like sharding [28], those cryptocurrency-based blockchain solutions bring up other
issues when introducing into IoT systems. The identified challenges are presented as
follows:
1) The trade-off between scalability and efficiency: The IoT applications, such as
smart surveillance system, involve a large volume of generated transaction data
among users and service providers, the efficient throughput and lower latency
become key metrics of designing blockchain protocol for IoT. Utilizing BFT
and state-machine replication protocols can potentially improve the efficiency
with the trade-off of poor scalability, which causes system security issues like
being vulnerable to Sybil attack. Furthermore, IoT systems generally rely on
identity registration and authentication process to enroll known participants due
to legal and compliance reasons, implementing permissioned blockchain for IoT
could ensure a certain level of security with the supplementary node identity
management.
2) The cost for transaction confirmation and storage: Since IoT devices are resource-
constrained with limited computation and storage capacity, the high complexity
consensus based on computing intensive cryptographic algorithms like PoW is
not affordable to IoT applications. In addition, storing the whole blockchain
history to validate the current state is not only overwhelming for storage con-
strained IoT devices, but also introduces longer bootstrap time when new nodes
join the network. Furthermore, blockchain runs on a peer-to-peer network and
consensus protocol requires frequent data transmissions and exchanges to ensure
consistent records in distributed ledger. It will bring significant communication
overhead on light IoT networks and extra energy consumption by data transmis-
sion. Thus, lightweight considerations, such as efficient transaction processing,
optimized chain-data organization, and energy saving, etc., are critical to design
new blockchain consensus algorithms for IoT systems.
3) The conflicts between transparency and privacy: As an important characteristic
of blockchain, transparency allows all participants to access blockchain data and
audit the transactions. However, it brings concerns on privacy issues for some IoT
systems, such as e-health and smart home, where the collected sensitive user data
should be confidential and are only accessible to authorized entities. Enforcing
access control mechanism to some extent encounters the transparency principle
of blockchain. But for some IoT applications like supply chain management, data
traceability is mandatory at the cost of transaction transparency. Thus, trade-off
between transparency and privacy becomes an import factor in the design of
blockchain based IoT systems.
4) Security on IoT data and blockchain: IoT devices are vulnerable to network
attacks compared with computers and cloud service, Corrupted IoT data from
compromised devices make the cast that data itself is not correct before sending
transactions to blockchain network. Hence, the data finalized in blockchain is
polluted. On the other hand, the blockchain consensus protocol can tolerant some
certain level of Byzantine failure given Byzantine nodes are below a threshold.
However, more compromised IoT devices also make the consensus vulnerable to
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Byzantine failure, so that data in the chain are not immutable. Security should be
considered in terms of IoT data and blockchain network.
.
Considering above challenges on incorporating blockchain technology into IoT
systems, designing optimized blockchain fabrics empowered with light and efficient
consensus protocols become a prospective solution. The following section will intro-
duceMicrochain to demonstrate how to implement a partially decentralized, scalable
and lightweight distributed ledger protocol for IoT applications.
6 Microchain Fabrics for IoT
To address challenges in integrating blockchain technologies into IoT systems, Mi-
crochain [54] was proposed by designing an efficient consensus mechanism running
on a small number of validators. The rationale for microchain is described as follows:
• Permissioned committee network: Following the idea of delegation, microchain
chooses a small subset of the nodes in the network as validators, and those
validators form a final committee, called dynasty, to perform a consensus function.
Permissioned networks could provide basic security primitives, such as public
key infrastructure (PKI), identity authentication and access control, etc. The
committee with limited validators also improves the performance of consensus
protocol by reducing messages propagation delay and blocks confirmation time.
• Random committee election: A random committee election ensures that commit-
tee members selection process is unpredictable. Even if attackers could compro-
mise the current committee, the probability that adversary controls consecutive
committee becomes exponentially decreased owing to the unbiased random pro-
tocol used in committee election process.
• Computational efficient virtual mining: Instead of using a brute-force manner
to solve a computation-intensive puzzle problem as PoW does, microchain uses
an computationally efficient virtual mining way called Proof-of-Credit (PoC)
to enable probabilistic block generation among committee members. For every
epoch of block generation, a validator is only allowed to calculate hash value once
to solve puzzle problem, and the probability that a validator could mine a block is
associated with its credit distribution in the current dynasty. Such a virtual mining
process is affordable to be executed by resource-constrained IoT devices with a
limited computation overhead resulted from the hash calculation and signature
verification.
• Deterministic chain finality: PoC offers a probabilistic block generation, however,
it will inevitably produces forks during chain extension. Inspired by the idea
from BFT style consensus protocols, microchain introduces a voting-based chain
finality to provide deterministic finality for chained blocks. The voting-based
chain finality method ensures that all finalized blocks will never be tampered with
or revoked from the blockchain.
24 Ronghua Xu and Yu Chen
• Incentives compatibility: The consensus protocol should be incentive compatible,
which means that any consensus node will suffer from finical loss whenever it
deviates from truthfully following the protocol. The microchain uses an incentive
mechanism which is based on proper rewarding and punishment polices to offer
incentive compatibility. The rewarding strategies motivate more nodes join the
blockchain network to maximize their benefit, while punishment strategies are
aimed to discourage participants from misbehaving or launching attacks.
6.1 System Architecture Design
The microchain network is shown in the upper part of Fig. 7. The microchain is built
on top of a permissioned networkwhere only registered entities are authorized access
to the network, allowed to interact with other validators, and contribute to consensus
protocol, such as transactions propagation, block verification andmining. For dynasty
epoch during a fixed time period, a final committee is responsible for key functions of
consensus protocol, like transactions processing, blocks generation and chain finality.
A random committee formation protocol ensures that the committee election process
is unpredictable. During the lifetime of each dynasty, a final-committee consensus
mechanism is responsible for proposing blocks and finalizing the chain history given
an unbounded time delay [54]. Given the assumption that a synchronous network
in which operations of processes are coordinated in rounds with bounded delay
constraints, microchain ensures persistence and liveness, which are two formal
proprieties of a robust distributed ledger.
The performance and security proprieties of microchain system are relied on a
light and efficient consensus protocol design. The final committee consensus protocol
is illustrated in lower Fig.7, and key components and workflows are described as
follows:
• Initialization: In the initialization process, a special dynasty, which includes a
group of validators specified by the administrator, acts as initial committee Dinit
to initialize blockchain. Each validator creates a genesis block B0 and sets the
local blockchain C = B0 and head = B0. The initial committee will work as the
first dynasty of the system until the election of the next dynasty.
• Committee Selection: At the beginning of the lifetime of each dynasty, the final-
committee formation protocol exploits a Verifiable Random Function (VRF)
based cryptographic sortition scheme [16] to randomly choose a subset of val-
idators V as the final-committee according to their credit weight. The selected
committee members D will be added to the current block, which is marked as the
beginning block of the new dynasty epoch. The lifetime of dynasty epoch starts
from committee selection and ends after dynasty change.
• Block Proposal: The block proposal mechanism uses a pure Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
protocol, called Proof-of-Credit (PoC), to generate new blocks in each block
proposal run. Only validators in the current dynasty can propose a new block.
The probability that a validator vj could propose a block is associated with its
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Fig. 7 Microchain system overview.
credit distribution of the current dynasty (pk j, cj), where pk j is the public key.
If validator vj could solve a puzzle in slot slt+1 by computing H(Bi, pk j, cj) ≤
dcond (dcond is difficulty condition target value), it generates new block Bi+1
and broadcasts it with a valid signature to all committee members of the current
dynasty. Each committee member accepts all valid blocks in the current slot, and
the verified block will be added to the local chain C with setting head = Bi+1.
• Chain Finality: At the end of an epoch, the head with epoch height becomes
a checkpoint that is used to resolve forks and finalize chain history. The chain
finality uses a voting-based algorithm to commit checkpoint block and finalizes
those already committed blocks on the main chain. The chain finality ensures
that only one path, including finalized blocks, becomes the main chain, as Fig.
7 shows. Therefore, the following blocks in the new epoch are only extended
on such a unique main chain. The chain fork problem is prevented by resolving
conflicting checkpoints and finalizing the history of the blockchain.
• Committee Change: At the end of the lifetime of a dynasty, the current committee
members agree on a newdynasty randomness string. The epoch randomness string
generation uses the RandShare mechanism to make an agreement on proposing
the next epoch randomness string among members of the final committee. Rand-
Share is a randomness protocol which is based on Publicly Verifiable Secret
Sharing (PVSS) [43, 39] to ensure unbiasability, unpredictability, and availability
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in public randomness sharing. The proposed unbiasable and unpredictable public
randomness string will be used for the committee selection process of the next
dynasty lifetime.
There are two core functions in epoch lifetime of chain extension: (1) the Proof-
of-Credit (PoC) protocol, which is a pure PoS mechanism, determines whether a
participant is selected to propose a block given fair initial distribution of the credit
stake to the committeemembers in a given epoch; and (2) aVoting based chain finality
(VCF) mechanism could protect against fork by resolving conflicting checkpoints
and finalize the history of chain data.
6.2 Prototype Implementation and Evaluation
To verify the proposed solution, a concept-proof prototype of microchain is imple-
mented in Python, consisting of approximately 3000 lines of code. Flask [2] is used,
which provide a micro-framework for Python application, to develop networking
and web service functions. All security functions are produced by using the standard
python lib cryptography [4]. The key generation and signature are implemented over
RSA, and the hash function uses SHA-256. SQLite[5], which is a lightweight and
embedded SQL database engine, is used to manage data such as node, block, and
vote information.
The prototype is deployed on a physical network environment, including multiple
nodes. Table 1 describes devices used for the experimental setup. Five validators are
deployed on a desktop while other validators run on sixteen distributed Raspberry
Pis to emulate an IoT environment. Each validator is only deployed on one host
machine.
Table 1 Configuration of Experimental Nodes.
Device Dell Optiplex 760 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+
CPU 3 GHz Intel Core TM (2 cores) Broadcom ARM Cortex A53 (ARMv8), 1.4GHz
Memory 4GB DDR3 1GB SDRAM
Storage 250G HHD 32GB (microSD card)
OS Ubuntu 16.04 Raspbian GNU/Linux (Jessie)
6.3 Network Latency
To evaluate the network latency incurred by executing microchain on IoT devices
in terms of the number of nodes, validators are deployed on 16 Raspberry Pis
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performing an entire round of final-committee consensus. The block size used in the
test is 128KB to reduce the influence of block sizes on network performance. The
latency of committing a transaction Tct is used for evaluating the time for all nodes of
the dynasty to accept a broadcasted transaction. Since the communication complexity
of broadcasting transactions is O(K). The latency of committing transactions is a
linear scale to committee size K , and it varies from 162 ms to 246 ms. The latency
of block proposal Tbp calculates how long the proposed blocks could be arrived
and verified among validators. Since the block proposal algorithm is proportion to
credit distribution D with expectation E(D), the latency of block proposal is scale
to communication complexity O( K2
E(D) ), which varies from 0.5 s to 1.7 s. Finally,
the latency of chain finality Tc f is the time it takes the voting process for finalizing
the checkpoint block to complete among all nodes. Owning to the communication
complexity O(K2) in the voting-based chain finality process, The Tc f is greatly
influenced by the number of nodes. Given 16 validators in the committee, the latency
could be 21.5 s, while the scenario with four nodes only introduces 1.4 s latency.
6.4 Throughput Evaluation
In the following set experiments, fiveRaspberry Pis work as validators in the commit-
tee to focus on throughput given limited influence from the committee size. To evalu-
ate howmuch data could be processed during a certain period, the block confirmation
time is calculated Tbc = (Tct +Tbp+Tc f ), which takes for microchain to complete an
entire round of final-committee consensus with a varying block size between 512K
and 4M. The block data throughput could be specified as Th = TbcBlock_size × 3600
(M/h), where M/h means Mbytes per hour. Test on varying block size, the result
is: Th512K=202 (M/h), Th1M=293 (M/h), Th2M=405 (M/h), and Th4M=263 (M/h).
Given fix transaction size like 1K, increasing the block size allows committing more
transactions, and therefore reach a higher throughput, which maximizes the system
capability. In the test, running microchain with 2M block size implies a theoretical
maximum rate of 405×103K3600×1K ≈ 113 (tx/s). As block size increases, however,microchain
achieves higher throughput at the cost of increased latency, and the throughput is
constrained by network and system capability. For comparison, Bitcoin achieves a
throughput of processing about seven transactions per second by committing a 2MB
block per ten minutes.
7 Conclusions
Consensus is the core function of a blockchain system. This chapter introduces
the basics of distributed consensus and identifies consensus goals in distributed
systems. Given a comprehensive overview on blockchain consensus protocols in
terms of BFT-based consensus, Nakamoto consensus and their varieties, challenges
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on integrating blockchain with IoT are evaluated. Finally, microchain is introduced
as a case study that demonstrates the rationale and approach for designing scalable,
lightweight blockchain protocols for IoT systems.
Themicrochain provides a promising distributed ledger solution to IoT application
scenarios. However, there remains a number of open issues in designing blockchain
for IoT in term of security, scalability and efficiency. Although committee selection
could improve the scalability of microchain, more investigation and test are needed
to evaluate how committee selection algorithm scale to the network size. Another
challenge is redesigning chain structure to address the ever-growing chain data size,
which has a significant impact on computation and storage capability of IoT devices.
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